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Do Local Elites Capture Natural Disaster Reconstruction Funds? 
 
Abstract 
Using original survey data with rich, direct measures of local elites in rural Fiji, this 
paper examines potential elite capture in the allocation of natural disaster reconstruction 
funds. Allocations of housing construction materials – both receipt and amount received 
– across villages, clans, and households are strongly targeted on cyclone damage, and 
local elites do not receive larger benefits over time. As the supply of reconstruction funds 
is limited during early periods, more severely affected victims do not receive benefits 
early, while clan leaders and elite clans do receive benefits early within villages.   
 
I. Introduction 
Vulnerability to natural disaster is a major barrier to development, and 
augmenting the capacity for effective disaster management is critically important. 
Frequent reports point to an inefficient distribution of disaster relief by uncoordinated 
relief agents who lack pertinent information about the damage. This is not surprising, 
because relief agents give a higher priority to the speed of response than to evidence-
based decision making (de Ville de Goyet, 2008). Only recently has empirical research 
started to shed light on the performance of relief targeting. Morris and Wodon (2003) 
find that among Honduran victims of Hurricane Mitch, allocations of emergency aid were 
targeted on recipients’ damage, but the amounts received were not.  
As time passes, the main actions of disaster management shift from relief to 
recovery and reconstruction (de Ville de Goyet, 2008), and many believe that the 
allocation of relief, recovery, and reconstruction funds becomes more efficient as damage 
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information accumulates and agents’ coordination becomes more effective. Probably 
because of this perception, as well as a lack of data, empirical research on targeting 
reconstruction funds during post-emergency periods is lacking. This paper examines the 
allocation of housing reconstruction funds among cyclone victims in rural Fiji. 
Understanding the performance of targeting reconstruction funds as a primary allocation 
mechanism is important, but is not a main focus of the paper. Rather, my main goal is to 
address a question that researchers have not yet explored, but has potential to be of 
critical importance: Do local elites capture natural disaster reconstruction funds?  
Elite capture occurs when a powerful minority alters the nature of a particular 
program in their favor. Researchers have given considerable attention to elite capture as a 
potential drawback of participatory or decentralized development (World Bank, 2002; 
Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) theoretically examine the 
factors that might affect whether elite capture is more likely to occur at the local or 
national level, showing that higher income inequality results in more local capture. 
Consistent empirical findings have been obtained in community-based programs in Asia 
and Latin America, such as India’s employment generation program (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2006), Bangladesh’s Food-for-Education Program (Galasso and Ravallion, 
2005), and Ecuador’s Social Fund investment projects (Araujo et al., 2008).  
Platteau and Abraham (2002) argue that capture problems are also significant in 
more egalitarian lineage-based societies in Sub-Saharan Africa because of community 
imperfections with social stratification: Cultural norms restrict non-elites’ access to 
information and emphasize consensual decision-making. In Fiji and many other Pacific 
Island states, kin-based hierarchies play a central role in local governance (Turner, 1992), 
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underlying potential elite capture. In a related study, Leeson and Sobel (2008) find that a 
greater amount of disaster relief received is associated with higher public corruption 
across the United States. 
Most empirical works consider benefit allocation to be biased toward elites as 
evidence of elite capture. Such allocation patterns, however, can occur because of 
cultural norms that prioritize elites without their misappropriations. This is because 
allocations neutral to the community hierarchy disrupt the social equilibrium, resulting in 
conflict that community members – both elites and non-elites – seek to minimize. Some 
studies show that elites’ capturing program benefits is not necessarily pernicious to 
community development, because elites might take actions that benefit non-elites (i.e., 
‘benevolent capture’) (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Examples include broad-based 
satisfaction with outcomes of the elite-driven social fund process in Jamaica (Rao and 
Ibáňez, 2003), higher maintenance of infrastructure projects in communities with 
hereditary leaders in Pakistan (Khwaja, 2001), and pro-poor benefit allocation in 
communities controlled by elites in Indonesia’s poverty alleviation project (Dasgupta and 
Beard, 2007). 
This paper highlights elite domination as a potential secondary allocation 
mechanism of reconstruction funds. It is very difficult for researchers to distinguish 
between capture- and norm-based dominations, which are not mutually exclusive, 
because observers have difficulty observing elites’ misappropriations and non-elites 
hesitate to reveal them to avoid social sanction. The studies cited above do not show why 
elite domination leads to benevolent outcomes. Regardless of the underlying process of 
elite domination, it raises the question of the extent to which the allocation is equitable. 
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Understanding the efficiency and equity of disaster management is of great importance in 
small island states with their increasing dependency on emergency aid from donors and 
deteriorating indigenous coping mechanisms (e.g., Bertram, 1986; Campbell, 1984). In 
contrast to extensive anthropological studies, there are very few economic studies of the 
Pacific region based on household survey data. 
Though my Fijian data, like others, have no direct information to distinguish 
between capture and norms, its three unique features enable me to better explore elite 
domination patterns. First, since households in each village are stratified by their kin 
group (clan) and elite status, direct measures of elite status are available. In standard 
household surveys, in contrast, elite status is often unobservable to researchers, and even 
if it is observable, there are too few elites to make a statistical analysis possible. Most 
empirical studies on community-based development programs rely on measures of 
consumption, income, or asset inequality to examine elite capture with the assumption 
that power is correlated with wealth; instead, this paper directly identifies elite 
dominance.  
Second, a direct comparison of relief and reconstruction is made possible by 
original survey data gathered in 2005 in the same area as my other study (Takasaki, 
forthcoming), but from many more villages and households than my original sample in 
2003. Distinct from my companion work on relief allocation within villages in the six 
months after the cyclone, this paper examines the allocation of housing reconstruction 
funds at the village, clan, and household levels over a three-year period.  
Third, information about the timing of receipt of reconstruction funds enables me 
to explore the temporal dimension of targeting and elite domination. Let me define 
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temporal targeting as follows: The larger the damage, the earlier the receipt or the greater 
the amount received in early periods. Temporal elite domination is defined analogously: 
Local elites receive benefits earlier or receive greater benefits during early periods than 
non-elites. These patterns can be a result of either capture or norms, though they are 
treated as early capture in previous works (Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1999). In contrast, 
non-temporal targeting and non-temporal elite domination, respectively, do not involve a 
temporal dimension: The greater the damage, the higher the probability of receipt or the 
greater the amount received, and local elites are more likely to be a recipient or to receive 
a greater amount than non-elites.   
Main findings of the paper are summarized as follows. Non-temporal targeting in 
allocations of housing reconstruction funds – both receipt and amount received – is 
strong at the village, clan, and household levels over time, and neither non-temporal nor 
temporal elite domination of amounts received exists at any level. A limited supply of 
funds during early periods of extended reconstruction, however, precludes temporal 
targeting in receipt and amounts received at any level, and temporal elite domination of 
receipt by clan leaders and elite clans occurs within villages.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes elite status in 
Fijian society and the data. Section III provides a description of cyclone damage and 
reconstruction. Section IV offers descriptive evidence of targeting and elite domination. 
Section V discusses the econometric specification, which is followed by estimation 
results in Section VI and discussions in Section VII. The last section concludes.       
II. Elite status and data  
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Each native Fijian belongs to a lineage of the vanua-yavusa-mataqali-tokatoka 
hierarchy illustrated in Figure 1 (Ravuvu, 1983). Each class of kin group (except for 
vanua, a highest-order class) is a subset of its higher-order class (e.g., yavusa 2 consists 
of mataqali 1 and 2). Vanua ranges over several villages, roughly matching a district; 
there is one or a few yavusa in each village.  
Kin-based elite status is defined as follows. First, Fijian villages are categorized 
into either one with a highly ranked vanua chief who assumes traditional duties across 
villages (chief’s village), or other (village 1 vs. 2). Second, mataqali (henceforth called 
clan) is either one with a yavusa or mataqali chief who assumes traditional duties within 
the village (chief’s clan), or other (mataqali 1 vs. 2). Third, some Fijian households have 
a kin leader (including kin chief) defined at the yavusa, mataqali, or tokatoka level (there 
is no takatoka chief) who plays a major role in the group’s decision-making and 
negotiations among groups in the village (clan leader), and others do not (household 1 vs. 
2). Village chiefs are shared by some clan leaders and are not necessarily kin chiefs.  
These kin groups and elite status are traditionally assigned and permanent, 
underlying Fijian livelihoods as well as local governance and ritual (Turner, 1992). In 
particular, land is communally owned by mataqali (about 83% of the country’s total land 
is communal), and customary rights for coastal fishing are held by vanua or several 
yavusa. Local elite status is also held by leaders of groups other than kin groups in the 
village, such as church, women’s, and school groups (non-clan leaders). Non-clan 
leaders include gatekeepers (turaga ni koro), who handle most matters in connection with 
the local government (receiving information and materials and distributing them to 
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villagers); the number of gatekeepers in the present data is too small for statistical 
analysis. Non-clan leadership is neither permanent nor directly related to kinship.  
On 13 January 2003, Cyclone Ami swept over the northern and eastern regions of 
the Fiji Islands (Ami was the only cyclone in the northern region from 1991 through 2005, 
McKenzie et al., 2005). In July-September 2005, I conducted a household survey in 
Cakaudrove Province in the northern region. The province is located mainly on Vanua 
Levu Island and Taveuni Island, the second- and third-largest islands in the country, 
which significantly lag behind the largest island, Viti Levu, where the state capital, two 
international airports, and most tourism businesses are situated. The province has 134 
villages in 16 districts, among which one has two chief’s villages, another has none, and 
the other 14 have one. In each district, villages are stratified by chief’s village status; 15 
chief’s villages were sampled (one chief’s village was not because of a political concern), 
and another 28 villages with distinct environmental and economic conditions were 
intentionally chosen.  
The sampling frame is a household census made by enumerators in each village; 
the cyclone caused no casualties and only three households left the village after it 
occurred. In each village, households are stratified by tokatoka and a combination of 
clan/non-clan leadership status and major asset holdings, such as shops (i.e., whether any 
leadership status or major asset is held); the population consists of 1,916 households in 
242 tokatoka, constituting 443 strata. In each stratum, households were randomly 
sampled with selection probability negatively related to the size of the stratum, yielding 
967 sample households (50% of the population). Only a small proportion of households 
were not interviewed, mostly because of their temporary absence during the survey; thus, 
  
8
 
attrition bias is unlikely to be a major concern. Overall, the survey covered 906 
households, 234 tokatoka, and 146 mataqali in 43 villages.   
Descriptive statistics at the village, clan, and household levels, respectively, are 
reported in panels A, B, and C of Table 1: 35% of villages, 17% of clans (mataqali), and 
19% of households are chief’s villages, chief’s clans, and clan leaders, respectively; there 
are non-clan leaders in all villages, 55% of clans, and 10% of households. The data thus 
contain sufficient variations of local elites for statistical analysis.  
III. Cyclone damage and reconstruction 
The total damage across the country caused by Cyclone Ami is estimated at 
F$104 million (F$1 = US$.60), of which dwelling damage is F$22 million and crop 
damage is F$40 million (National Disaster Management Office, 2003). According to 
respondents’ subjective assessments, 62% of residents’ dwellings – a main house and/or 
free-standing units, such as the kitchen, shower, and toilet (not all households have such 
units, as such facilities are often located inside the main house) – were damaged in the 
sample (panel C of Table 1): 19% and 34% of main houses were completely destroyed 
and partially damaged, respectively, and 53% of households experienced damage to free-
standing units (44% of households experienced both damages). The mean value of total 
dwelling damage was F$1,074, or equivalently about 10% of mean household earned 
income per annum at the time of interviews. Dwelling damage was experienced by at 
least one household in all villages and 88% of clans (panels A and B, respectively). 
The Red Cross, other nongovernmental organizations, and governments 
provisioned emergency relief. While almost all households received emergency food aid 
(30% of their food consumption over six months after the cyclone, on average), a small 
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proportion of victims received tarpaulins that could be used as emergency shelters and for 
temporary dwelling repair (Takasaki, forthcoming).  
Housing reconstruction programs followed. Construction materials were 
provisioned, and if needed, carpenters were sent to villages to help build new houses 
(villagers helped each other with rebuilding and repairing). In the survey, each household 
was asked whether it received construction materials, and the recipient was asked about 
the year and month of receipt and the monetary value of construction materials received. 
One quarter of households were recipients, and the mean amount in the whole sample 
was F$685; the mean amount among recipients was F$2,821, which is almost the same as 
the mean value of total dwelling damage in the same sub-sample. At least one recipient 
household was in 54% of clans and 88% of villages.  
After the cyclone, a new house was built by 9% of households, almost all of 
which experienced dwelling damage, especially complete destruction of their main house 
(results not shown). Among those with a completely destroyed main house, more than 
half of recipients built a new house, while 20% of non-recipients did so (information 
about repairing is lacking). Thus, provisions of construction materials greatly helped 
reconstruction, but those for new house building were insufficient and self-reconstruction 
was relatively common. 
Indeed, provisions of construction materials took time. Figure 2 depicts the 
numbers of households that received construction materials and the mean amounts among 
recipients by quarter (the last quarter, 2005-3, when interviews were conducted and thus 
for which the record is incomplete, is included in the regression analysis below; the 
results are similar when it is excluded). The numbers of recipients and the amounts 
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received were small during early quarters and increased later: 2004-1 onward and 2004-4 
onward, respectively. That is, housing reconstruction programs augmented in scale one 
year after the cyclone, and provisions of full construction materials for new house 
building were further delayed (in 2003-3 only one recipient received them).  
IV. Descriptive analysis of targeting and elite domination 
Non-temporal targeting of construction materials in the three-year period, 2003-
2005, was strong at the village, clan, and household levels: Both receipt and amounts 
received are strongly positively correlated with almost all damage measures (results not 
shown) and the error of inclusion (leakage) is very small – only 2% of recipients were 
households that experienced no dwelling damage (panel C of Table 1). The limited 
supply of reconstruction funds, however, resulted in a significant error of exclusion 
(under-coverage) – 60% of victims with a damaged dwelling were not recipients (results 
not shown). While households with a completely destroyed main house were targeted 
(48% of recipients), under-coverage was still common (35% of such victims were not 
recipients). As the supply of full construction materials for new house building was 
limited, small provisions were targeted toward victims with a partially damaged main 
house and with damaged free-standing units (42% and 8% of recipients, respectively).  
The limited supply of construction materials during early periods of 
reconstruction precluded temporal targeting: Correlation analysis in each year indicates 
that households with severer damage were late, not early, recipients, while benefit 
amounts were always targeted on damage (results not shown); similar patterns are also 
found at the clan and village levels.  
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Descriptive evidence of elite domination is limited to the following. First, chief’s 
clans and clans with non-clan leaders are more likely to be recipients in the three-year 
period, but not in early periods (panel B of Table 1). Second, the amounts received in 
early periods, but not in the three-year period, among recipient households are positively 
correlated with clan leaders (results not shown). To see whether these patterns hold when 
controlling for cyclone damage, a primary determinant of allocation, is a task of the 
remaining sections.  
V. Econometric specification  
I conjecture that allocation of construction materials y is determined not only by 
cyclone damage X (targeting), but also by social status Z (elite domination). I employ the 
following reduced-form models at the village (v), clan (g), and household (i) levels:  
vvvvv eWZXy ++++= 1111 δγβα ,      (1)  
ggggg eVWZXy +++++= 2222 δγβα ,     (2)  
iiiii eVWZXy +++++= 3333 δγβα ,     (3)  
where Wv, Wg, and Wi, respectively, are other village, clan, and household characteristics 
that affect the allocation; V is village dummies; and ev, eg, and ei are error terms. Whether 
victims reconstruct or repair their dwellings without receiving construction materials 
certainly affects the allocations of reconstruction funds, but this endogenous decision 
does not appear as an explanatory variable in the reduced-form equations (1)-(3) 
(examining self-reconstruction is not a focus of the paper).  
As village dummies fully control for village-level factors, including total 
construction materials allocated to the village, equations (2) and (3), respectively, focus 
on allocations across clans and households within the village. I also estimate equation (3), 
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replacing village dummies V with clan dummies G, which fully control for clan-level 
factors. If household-level factors are a driving force, then significant findings in the 
original equation (3), which does not control for clan-level factors – both observable and 
unobservable ones – must be robust to this alternative specification focusing on 
allocations within the clan. 
I first estimate the determinants of receipt using probit for the whole sample and 
those of log of the amount received among recipients using Ordinary Least-Squares 
(OLS) in the three-year period, 2003-2005. This is a two-part, or hurdle, model 
commonly used in previous works on targeting (Jayne et al., 2002; Dercon and Krishnan, 
2005); an alternative sample selection model is infeasible with these data, which lack the 
identifying instruments required to credibly estimate the selection equation. In equation 
(1), the dummy dependent variable takes one if there is at least one recipient household in 
a village, and the village means of the amount received are used to estimate the amount 
equation among recipient villages; equation (2) is estimated analogously. Non-temporal 
targeting and elite domination are measured by positive βj and γj, respectively.  
With temporal targeting and elite domination, respectively, impacts of cyclone 
damage and social status decrease over time. To test these patterns, I employ the same 
two-part model in the first year, 2003, and in the first two years, 2003-2004, separately 
and see whether βj and γj decrease as the time range increases from 1 year to 2 years, and 
to 3 years; alternatively, estimating the model in each year can be considered, but this 
requires using the receipt or the amount received in previous year(s) as a lagged 
dependent variable, the endogeneity of which cannot be controlled for with these data. 
For robustness check, I also estimate the determinants of the year of receipt among 
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recipients in the three-year period using an ordered probit (the year of receipt of a first-
recipient household in the village- and clan-level analyses). Distinct from the over-time 
comparison of effects of cyclone damage and social status on receipt in the probit, the 
ordered-probit directly estimates their effects on the order of receipt: Temporal targeting 
and elite domination are measured by negative βj and γj, respectively, as the greater the 
dependent variable (order), the later the receipt.  
I repeat all these analyses among eligible potential recipients – households with a 
damaged dwelling and clans containing at least one victimized household (all villages are 
eligible) – finding almost the same results as what are presented below. I conduct all 
analyses with and without considering the stratification and weighting design discussed 
above, finding very similar results, while significance levels improve in the former and 
the latter conservative results are presented below. 
Although retrospective errors in the receipt of construction materials should be 
minimal and those in the year of receipt should be also small (those in the month of 
receipt could be significant), those in the amount received could be considerable. A 
question is whether errors are correlated with covariates. In particular, households with 
more damage may have felt that the amount received was too small relative to the 
damage and may have reported smaller amounts than the actual ones, causing a 
downward bias in estimated impacts of the damage. This means that estimated positive βj 
in the amount equation (suggesting good targeting) should be qualitatively robust. 
Household-level cyclone damage Xi is captured by the log value of total dwelling 
damage or two dummies for a completely destroyed and partially damaged main house, 
respectively. The damage value measure is comprehensive, because it covers total 
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damage of all dwelling units, but its measurement errors could be considerable and 
systematic. Although the main house damage measure does not capture free-standing 
units owned by some households, retrospective errors in the damage status of each main 
house reported by individual households are minimal, because relief officers used the 
same three categories for their damage assessments (the damage status of each house was 
common knowledge among villagers). As shown below, results of these two damage 
measures are qualitatively the same, which gives me confidence about the findings’ 
robustness. Xv is measured by the village mean of total damage value or two variables for 
the proportions of households with completely destroyed and partially damaged main 
houses in the village, respectively; Xg is measured analogously. When the main house 
damage measures are used, βj should indicate a greater marginal effect for complete 
damage than partial damage.  
Social status Zv, Zg, and Zi, respectively, are measured by a dummy for chief’s 
villages, two dummies for chief’s clans and non-clan leaders’ clans, and two dummies for 
clan leaders and non-clan leaders, as defined above.       
Village characteristics Wv include village size and access, measured by the total 
number of households in the village (in the population) and travel time to a market (log), 
respectively; clan size, measured by the total number of households in the clan (in the 
population), is considered for clan characteristics Wg. Although it is expected that larger 
clans with more victims are more likely to be recipients in the village, how village size 
matters is ambiguous: Larger villages may be prioritized or they instead may be given a 
lower priority with a limited supply of funds. Geographical location certainly determines 
the delivery of emergency relief, but whether this is also the case for reconstruction funds 
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during post-emergency periods is an empirical question. In equations (2) and (3), all 
geographical factors are controlled for by village dummies. Household characteristics Wi 
are captured by asset holdings and demographic factors in a standard manner.1 If the 
allocation is determined by targeting and elite domination, as conjectured here, these 
household characteristics should not matter.  
VI. Estimation results  
Estimation results of the models with dwelling damage value at the village, clan 
(mataqali), and household levels are shown in panels A, B, and C of Table 2, 
respectively; results with main house damage at the household level are in panel D (those 
at the village and clan levels are qualitatively the same as those presented in panels A and 
B). In each panel, results of only cyclone damage and social status are reported:2 The 
two-part models in 2003-2005, 2003, and 2003-2004 are in columns (1)-(2), (3), and (4)-
(5), respectively, where estimated marginal effects at means are reported for the probit 
(the analysis of the amount received in 2003 is infeasible because of the small number of 
observations); estimated coefficients for the ordered probit are in column (6).3  
Non-temporal targeting is very significant in 2003-2005: Receipt and amount 
received are strongly targeted toward more severely affected victims, according to both 
dwelling damage value and main house damage, at the village, clan, and household levels 
(columns 1 and 2). In particular, the probability of being a recipient is higher by .72 and 
the amount received is 261% larger among households with a completely destroyed main 
house than others; comparable strong results are obtained at the village and clan levels (in 
all cases, partial main house damage exhibits much smaller impacts than complete 
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destruction, as expected). Although marginal effects of dwelling damage value on receipt 
are small, those on the amount received are large.  
There is no strong evidence of temporal targeting, however. Overall fitness of the 
models of receipt in 2003 and of year of receipt is weak at the village and clan levels. 
Only in receipt at the village level, consistent with temporal targeting, do the marginal 
effects of damage decrease over time, and correspondingly, the estimated coefficients of 
damage in the year-of-receipt equation are negative, but not statistically significant. 
According to both the receipt and year-of-receipt equations, clans with more severely 
affected victims appear to be rather late recipients; the estimated marginal effects are 
very small, however, and the result is not statistically significant with main house damage. 
A similar pattern is found at the household level, but in equation (3) with clan dummies, 
the estimated coefficient for dwelling damage value in the year-of-receipt equation loses 
statistical significance, indicating that household-level damage is not a driving force.   
Strong temporal, but not non-temporal, elite domination of receipt exists at the 
household level: (1) the probability of receipt in 2003-2004 (but not in 2003-2005) is 
higher by .10-.12 among clan leaders than others (column 4); and (2) conditional on 
receipt in 2003-2005, the probability of receipt in 2003 and 2005 is higher and lower by 
about .14-.15 and .12-.13, respectively, among clan leaders than non-leaders (these are 
marginal effects at means based on the estimated coefficients reported in column 6). 
When clan dummies are used, both results hold, confirming that household-level elite 
status is a driving force. Although elite domination by chief’s villages is nonexistent, 
temporal elite domination also exists at the clan level: The chief’s clans are more likely to 
be recipients than others in 2003-2004 (about .40 marginal effects) (column 4), though 
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the statistical significance is not strong (near 10%) and the corresponding year-of-receipt 
equation shows weak results, as discussed above; the result in 2003-2005 is weaker 
(column 1).  
Neither temporal nor non-temporal elite domination of amounts received exists at 
any level. Though the clan leader dummy exhibits a positive impact on the amount 
received in 2003-2004 (column 5), this is statistically significant only in models with 
main house damage and the result loses statistical significance with clan dummies. Nor is 
there evidence of domination by non-traditional elites in any form of allocation. Hence, 
although the regressions results on non-temporal targeting are consistent with earlier 
descriptive findings, this is not the case for temporal targeting and non-temporal/temporal 
elite domination. Controlling for targeting as a primary allocation mechanism is crucial to 
identify elite domination as a secondary allocation mechanism. 
VII. Discussions  
How does elite domination of reconstruction funds differ from that of emergency 
relief? Since crop damage is not very observable to other households and everyone 
demands food aid, there exist significant room and demand for capture; Takasaki 
(forthcoming), however, finds that neither clan leaders nor chief’s clans dominate food 
aid, because in a closely knit kin society, capturing relief allocated as part of risk sharing 
greatly deteriorates elites’ reputation (Dercon and Krishnan, 2005 also show that food aid 
is shared within villages in Ethiopia).  
In contrast to emergency food aid, the following relationships hold for housing 
construction materials. First, because only households with a damaged dwelling demand 
construction materials, capturing by non-victims is limited; indeed, leakage is minimal 
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(Takasaki, forthcoming finds a similar pattern in the receipt of tarpaulins). Second, 
information problems in housing damage among villagers and relief officers are very 
small. This precludes local elites from receiving larger benefits in any period, because the 
amount provisioned can be well determined based on the damage. Third, at the same time, 
the lumpiness of construction materials (especially for new house building) makes the 
allocation to recipients much more ‘discrete.’ Fourth, accordingly, a limited supply of 
construction materials gives rise to significant under-coverage, especially during early 
periods, making considerable room for local elites’ early receipt of benefits.     
How capture and norms work depends on the benefit-cost calculation of local 
elites and non-elites, respectively. For both elites and non-elites, benefits of receiving 
construction materials are much higher than those of receiving food aid (the mean value 
of construction materials received per adult equivalent among recipients is 6.5 times the 
mean value of food aid received per capita, as reported by Takasaki, forthcoming). 
Benefits peak in 2004 when the amount provisioned – especially for new house building 
– started to augment. For elites, the social cost of capturing construction materials must 
be much higher than that of capturing food aid, but that of manipulating the timing of 
receipt by one year or so should be much smaller than that of manipulating the recipients 
themselves. Similarly, for non-elites, the cost of waiting for receipt for another year or so 
might be smaller than their social cost of not conforming to cultural norms. As such, both 
capture and norms are consistent with the observed pattern of temporal elite domination. 
As traditional elites exercise their power the most and are prioritized highest in the 
village, clan leaders and elite clans are dominants.     
VIII. Conclusion  
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This paper shed new light on the local allocation of natural disaster reconstruction 
funds by highlighting potential elite capture among cyclone victims in rural Fiji. Its major 
findings suggest the following implications for disaster management in developing areas. 
First, with good information about damage in the reconstruction phase, targeting 
performance is strong and local elites’ capturing of larger benefits is not an issue. 
Effective targeting through good management of data and information (Amin and 
Goldstein, 2008) is crucial to prevent elite capture. Second, still, a scarce supply of 
reconstruction funds leads to local elites’ early receipt of benefits. Timely provision is 
thus of great importance not only to better support disaster victims, but also to reduce 
potential early capture. Third, in kin-based societies like Fiji, traditional elite status is a 
source of power for capturing and shapes cultural norms for consensual prioritizing. 
Development agents should pay attention to elite individuals and groups in their efforts to 
achieve equity within villages. Fourth, identifying local elites and their domination is 
more difficult than evaluating targeting performance. Carefully designing post-disaster 
surveys to collect direct measures of elite status for econometric analysis would be very 
useful for a more thorough exploration of capture problems. Last, differentiating between 
capture and norms is a big empirical challenge. More research on the process of local 
benefit allocation is needed. Understanding allocation mechanisms beyond targeting can 
greatly help disaster management and post-disaster development. 
Notes 
 
1 Household characteristics include land holdings (log), fishing capital (log), a dummy for 
secondary education among adults, household adult equivalent size (log), proportions of 
children and elderly, age of household head (log), and a dummy for female head. All of 
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these are measured at the time of interviews. It is better to use measures before or right 
after the cyclone, but such data are lacking. In particular, land holding and fishing capital 
can be endogenous, because the receipt of construction materials can alter household 
investment decisions. To address this problem, I estimate models excluding these two 
assets, finding very similar results on all remaining variables. For the same reason, 
income is not included, though these household characteristics control for permanent 
income. Note also that village dummies control for income inequality (also in equation 2).  
2 Findings about village, clan, and household characteristics are as follows. Although the 
allocation is neutral to village access, smaller villages are more likely to be recipients in 
2003-2004, but not in 2003-2005. As expected, larger clans are more likely to be 
recipients in 2003-2004 and 2003-2005; the results are statistically significant, however, 
only in the models with main house damage. Almost no household characteristics are 
strong determinants in any form of allocations; the only exception is that households with 
more children (in proportion) tend to receive larger amounts in 2003-2004 and 2003-2005. 
Because household size, as well as other demographic factors, is controlled for separately, 
this result gives evidence that allocations favor children. When household characteristics 
are not controlled for, the results of cyclone damage and social status are very similar to 
the findings presented here, indicating that the correlations of social status and household 
characteristics are not a main concern in these analyses.   
3 Equation (2) can be applied only to villages in which there exist across-clan variations 
in receipt during the period of interest in the probit and the years of receipt among 
recipient clans in the ordered probit; without such variations, village dummies perfectly 
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predict them. Analogously, equation (3) can be applied only to villages with sufficient 
across-household variations. Accordingly, there are far fewer observations for these 
analyses. The numbers of observations for the analyses conditional on receipt – OLS and 
ordered probit – further decline, especially in 2003. I also estimated equation (2) at the 
tokatoka level, finding very similar results.     
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Mean. 
test 
(p-value)
A. Village
Chief's village dummy 0.35 (0.48) 0.40 (0.55) 0.34 (0.48) 0.804
Non-clan leaders dummy 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) n.a.
Damaged dwelling dummy 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) n.a.
Proportion of damaged dwelling 0.64 (0.21) 0.37 (0.24) 0.68 (0.18) 0.001
Proportion of completely destroyed main houses 0.21 (0.16) 0.07 (0.08) 0.23 (0.16) 0.031
Proportion of partially damaged main houses 0.34 (0.15) 0.26 (0.15) 0.35 (0.14) 0.162
Proportion of damaged free-standing units 0.55 (0.21) 0.33 (0.22) 0.58 (0.19) 0.009
Village mean of total dwelling damage (F$) 1160 (771) 287 (203) 1275 (744) 0.006
Construction materials receipt dummy 0.88 (0.32) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) n.a.
Village mean of construction materials received (F$) 775 (849) 0 (0) 877 (852) 0.006
Proportion of new main house building 0.10 (0.1) 0.02 (0.0) 0.12 (0.1) 0.028
No. observations 43 5 38
B. Clan
Chief's clan dummy 0.17 (0.38) 0.10 (0.31) 0.23 (0.42) 0.049
Non-clan leaders dummy 0.55 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 0.67 (0.47) 0.001
Damaged dwelling dummy 0.88 (0.32) 0.75 (0.44) 1.00 (0.00) 0.000
Proportion of damaged dwelling 0.59 (0.32) 0.41 (0.34) 0.73 (0.21) 0.000
Proportion of completely destroyed main houses 0.18 (0.23) 0.06 (0.12) 0.27 (0.26) 0.000
Proportion of partially damaged main houses 0.32 (0.28) 0.28 (0.30) 0.34 (0.26) 0.189
Proportion of damaged free-standing units 0.49 (0.31) 0.34 (0.32) 0.62 (0.25) 0.000
Clan mean of total dwelling damage (F$) 994 (1165) 352 (539) 1538 (1274) 0.000
Construction materials receipt dummy 0.54 (0.50) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) n.a.
Clan mean of construction materials received (F$) 680 (1366) 0 (0) 1257 (1654) 0.000
Proportion of new main house building 0.08 (0.2) 0.01 (0.1) 0.15 (0.2) 0.000
No. observations 146 67 79
C. Household
Clan leader dummy 0.19 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.18 (0.38) 0.412
Non-clan leader dummy 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.29) 0.14 (0.34) 0.055
Damaged dwelling dummy 0.62 (0.49) 0.50 (0.50) 0.98 (0.15) 0.000
Completely destroyed main house dummy 0.19 (0.39) 0.09 (0.28) 0.48 (0.50) 0.000
Partially damaged main house dummy 0.34 (0.47) 0.32 (0.46) 0.42 (0.50) 0.003
Damaged free-standing units dummy 0.53 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49) 0.86 (0.35) 0.000
Total dwelling damage (F$) 1074 (2138) 466 (1160) 2881 (3134) 0.000
Construction materials receipt dummy 0.25 (0.43) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) n.a.
Construction materials received (F$) 685 (1983) 0 (0) 2821 (3191) 0.000
New main house building dummy 0.09 (0.3) 0.03 (0.2) 0.28 (0.5) 0.000
No. observations 903 676 227
Table 1. Means of elite status, housing damage, construction materials, and reconstruction by receipt.
Non-recipients Recipients
Note - Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Mean test results with a 5% significance level are bolded.
All
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Table 2. Allocation of construction materials.
0.025 ** 1.784 *** 0.230 ** 0.046 ** 1.279 *** -0.391
(0.051) (0.181) (0.100) (0.081) (0.283) (0.278)
-0.020 0.242 0.015 -0.009 0.025 0.178
(0.042) (0.312) (0.170) (0.027) (0.495) (0.502)
-7.2 -26.4 -9.5 -32.5
Chi sq./F (p-value) 0.002 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.001 0.573
0.533 0.702 0.107 0.542 0.358 0.061
43 38 43 43 35 38
0.380 *** 0.781 *** 0.071 0.168 *** 0.908 *** 0.394 *
(0.259) (0.130) (0.049) (0.055) (0.257) (0.217)
0.315 -0.165 0.132 0.406 -0.803 -1.048
(0.274) (0.536) (0.257) (0.236) (0.679) (0.737)
0.016 0.370 0.100 -0.209 0.823 -0.709
(0.253) (0.356) (0.160) (0.224) (0.485) (0.456)
-22.5 -32.1 -27.0 -37.9
Chi sq./F (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.799 0.001 0.000 0.131
0.573 0.813 0.167 0.450 0.762 0.255
76 61 58 71 49 51
0.082 *** 0.479 *** 0.021 *** 0.062 *** 0.485 *** 0.095 *
(0.006) (0.075) (0.004) (0.006) (0.104) (0.057)
0.030 0.230 0.007 0.102 ** 0.516 -0.514 *
(0.046) (0.267) (0.031) (0.054) (0.320) (0.267)
0.051 -0.060 0.014 0.026 0.127 0.003
(0.054) (0.290) (0.035) (0.048) (0.345) (0.282)
-270.3 -111.7 -267.5 -150.8
Chi sq./F (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.421 0.532 0.187 0.311 0.525 0.200
773 207 428 689 153 186
0.715 *** 2.610 *** 0.199 *** 0.507 *** 2.686 *** 0.510
(0.043) (0.271) (0.068) (0.058) (0.338) (0.350)
0.384 *** 0.728 *** 0.134 *** 0.344 *** 0.834 *** -0.139
(0.045) (0.257) (0.042) (0.046) (0.301) (0.359)
0.056 0.306 0.016 0.119 ** 0.570 * -0.558 **
(0.053) (0.276) (0.039) (0.056) (0.309) (0.271)
0.081 0.165 0.024 0.056 0.359 0.050
(0.059) (0.247) (0.044) (0.053) (0.322) (0.283)
-299.2 -116.4 -288.2 -147.4
Chi sq./F (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.360 0.633 0.152 0.258 0.634 0.218
774 207 428 690 153 186
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003-2005 2003 2003-2004 2003-2005
No. observations
Log likelihood
Log likelihood
Clan mean of log dwelling 
damage value (F$)
Chief's clan dummy
Non-clan leaders' clan 
dummy
Pseudo-R sq./R sq.
No. observations
Non-clan leader dummy
Log dwelling damage value 
(F$)
Clan leader dummy
Log likelihood
Non-clan leader dummy
Pseudo-R sq./R sq.
Completely damaged main 
house dummy
Partially damaged main 
house dummy
Clan leader dummy
*10% significance, **5% significance, ***1% significance. Columns (1), (3), and (4) are marginal effects at means in probit 
estimates with standard errors in parentheses; columns (2) and (5) are OLS estimates conditional on receipt with robust standard 
errors in parentheses; and column (6) is ordered probit estimates conditional on receipt with standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls which are not shown here are village characteristics in panel A, clan characteristics in panel B, household 
characteristics in panels C and D, village dummies in panels B and C, and constant in columns (2), (5), and (6).
A. Village - dwelling damage value.
B. Clan - dwelling damage value.
Pseudo-R sq./R sq.
No. observations
Village mean of log dwelling 
damage value (F$)
Chief's village dummy
Pseudo-R sq./R sq.
Log likelihood
No. observations
C. Household - dwelling damage value.
D. Household - main house damage.
Receipt - 
Probit 
marginal 
effects
Amount 
received 
among 
recipients - 
OLS
Receipt - 
Probit 
marginal 
effects
Receipt - 
Probit 
marginal 
effects
Amount 
received 
among 
recipients - 
OLS
Year of receipt 
among 
recipients - 
Ordered probit 
coefficients
(5) (6)
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Figure 1. Fijian kin strcuture.
(District 1)
Vanua 1
(Village 1) (Village 2)
Yavusa 1 Yavusa 2
Mataqali 1 Mataqali 2
Tokatoka 1 Tokatoka 2
Household 1 Household 2
Note: Chief's village, chief's clan, and clan leader are bolded.  
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Figure 2. Evolution of provisions of construction materials
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